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Incógnitas, variables y otros fantasmas matemáticos. El lenguaje de la variación y la covariación numéricas
By Angel Marín. Pamplona (Universidad Pública de Navarra). 2006. ISBN 84-9769-173-3, 500 pp. No price given
The first difficulty the reader encounters with this book is understanding what it is about. Ostensibly it is about
providing a philosophical account of some crucial notions involved in the evolution of classical mathematics, from
Greek geometry up to nineteenth-century analysis. Yet, no effort is made either to clarify the specific tasks this account
is supposed to pursue, or to identify the notions it is about. The words ‘analysis’, ‘magnitude’, ‘number’, ‘variable’
occur very often in the book and this suggests that such notions are among those that Angel Marín wants to explain.
However, no claim in which these words enter is fully intelligible. As an example, here is how Angel Marín presents
his aim (pp. 13–14):
I do not exaggerate [. . .] if I say that the mathematical use of symbols constitutes its more decisive feature, once ar-
rived to the modernity, and that in this combination of referential symbol and referred object lies the key of some of the
most important mathematical concepts. Hence, if we aim to shed new light on the evolution of the discipline, it seems
necessary we take at last into account, in a detailed way, the question of reference. This leads to paths that mathemati-
cians little pass through, where philosophical exigencies are imposed. It is not common, for example, to consider this
dense methodological discourse, that progressively articulate mathematics, from the point of view of linguistic pragmat-
ics. Some philosophical arguments have been occasionally advanced on punctual questions, almost always with respect
to the existence of mathematical entities, but no theoretical reason has been offered to explain convincingly the symbolic
nature of mathematical discourse and to stress its peculiarity. An account that searches for the origins of this symbolic
pragmatics is still missing. Hence I wanted to undertake a study that contribute to overcome this deficiency and, by the
way, to promote the discussion about one of the most important mathematical concepts: the concept of variable.1
I understand that Angel Marín wants to account for the origins and possibly the evolution of the concept of variable
in mathematics from the point of view of linguistic pragmatics. But what is that? Some lines after (p. 15) he writes:
[. . .] thanks to this subterfuge [the introduction of a literal species] some criteria of use for a language of a new kind
have been fixed. To many people, giving nominal identity to that which is merely supposed could be questionable, but
giving it to that which does not exist bordered the absurd. When Newton turned to these pragmatic criteria to express with
symbols that which, up to that moment, had been accepted on the basis of the principle of continuity and on the geometric
representation of magnitudes, part of the mystery that surrounded symbols was driven away and the first signs of alarms
appeared.2
1 No exagero, incluso, si digo que el uso matemático de los símbolos constituye su rasgo más decisivo una vez llegados a la modernidad y que en
esta combinación entre símbolo referencial y objeto referido reside la clave de algunos de los más importantes conceptos matemáticos. De modo
que, si pretendemos arrojar nueva luz sobre la evolución de la disciplina, parece obligado que hagamos por fin de la cuestión de la referencia objeto
de detenida consideración. Esto conduce a senderos poco transitados por los matemáticos, en los que se imponen exigencias de índole filosófica.
No es común, por ejemplo, ver todo esto denso discurso metodológico, que progresivamente articula las matemáticas, desde la perspectiva de
la pragmática lingüística. Se han avanzado en ocasiones argumentos filosóficos acerca de cuestiones puntuales, casi siempre relacionadas con la
existencia de entidades matemáticas, pero no se han apuntado razones teóricas que expliquen suficientemente y que destaquen la peculiar naturaleza
simbólica del discurso matemático. Aún nos falta un relato que rastree los orígenes de esa pragmática simbólica. Por eso quise emprender un estudio
que contribuyera a superar esta carencia y de paso a promover el debate en torno a uno de los conceptos matemáticos más importantes, el concepto
de variable.
2 [. . .] gracias a este subterfugio [la introducción de una species literal] se fijaran criterios de uso para un lenguaje de nuevo cuño. Para muchos dar
identidad nominal a lo supuesto podía resultar cuestionable, pero dárselo a lo inexistente rayaba lo absurdo. Cuando Newton recurrió a estos criteriosdoi:10.1016/j.hm.2008.03.002
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literal notations or formalism used in mathematics. But if this is so, he is certainly wrong in claiming that only few
and locals studies have been devoted to the evolution of mathematics from such a point of view.
Unfortunately, his book only adds to the abundant literature on this topic a huge amount of incomprehensible
claims, constructed by combining mathematical and philosophical terminology in quite a free way. If I understand
it rightly, the first part of the book (Chapters 1–4) is devoted to ancient and early-modern mathematics, from Euclid
to Descartes, while the second part (Chapters 5–9), considers subsequent developments, though only Chapter 9 is
devoted to the 18th and 19th centuries. I am not able to summarize Marín’s theses (if any). Every chapter concludes
with what seems to be a summary of the main results gotten in it. But, platitudes apart, no one of them is intelligible
for me. Take the example of the conclusion to Chapter 6, devoted to Newton’s theory of fluxions. One finds there
assertions as these (pp. 304–305):
[. . .] relatively to the referential concern, strictly speaking, these new algebraic figures, namely polynomials and series,
stress the formal and neutral (unsaturated, Frege would say) character of the indeterminate [quantity, taken] as index. In this
framework, Newton runs into difficulties to find the last numerical reference to many questions. Attempts to assimilate the
cinematic behaviour of curves to geometrical terms find their Gordian knot in the tangent. The computation of its measure
appears as a problematic subject. As in previous authors one tries to go beyond the effect of continuity in the action of
measuring with base in the postulation of an atomized continuous dismembered in meaningful and operatives, but still
infinitesimal, parts.3
I leave Marín’s appreciation of Newton’s attitude apart. I merely remark that—as any philosopher of mathematics
knows—Frege’s notion of unsaturated entities (that is, concepts, in his sense of this term) is quite far from that of
being formal or neutral. This is a characteristic example of the free use of philosophical terminology in Marín’s
book.
The book also contains many errors in historical matters of fact as well as in mathematical technicalities. Two
examples from the first chapter should be enough. On p. 34, Marín argues that the paradigm of geometric analysis is
fixed by Euclid in an interpolation to book XIII of the Elements; then, on p. 39, the definition of analysis included in
this interpolation is mentioned as ‘what has been written by Euclid’. He not only seems to forget what ‘interpolation’
means but, which is far worse, ignores the large literature concerned with the problem of attribution and dating of this
definition. On pp. 36–37, an example is provided to illustrate it. Yet, instead of taking up any of the five alternative
proofs of propositions XIII.1–5 that follow the method of analysis and synthesis and were added to Euclid’s, he
considers Euclid’s own proof of proposition XIII.4. This one, he says, is a “characteristic example of the method of
application of areas.” This is a most troublesome claim, since no application of areas occurs in Euclid’s proof.
There is much room, in my view, for a philosophical account of classical mathematics and its language. Unfor-
tunately Marín’s book lacks the bibliographical information, historical scholarship, philosophical sophistication, and
mathematical precision that this important task would require. I hope nobody will take it as an example of the results
that the mutual collaboration of philosophy and history of mathematics can produce.
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Available online 11 April 2008pragmáticos para expresar con símbolos lo que hasta entonces se aceptaba como fundado en el principio de continuidad y en la representación
geométrica de magnitudes, se disipó en parte el misterio que rodeaba a los símbolos y aparecieron las primeras señales de alarma.
3 [. . .] en el orden propiamente referencial, estas nuevas figuras algebraicas, particularmente el polinomio o la serie, acentúan el carácter formal
y neutro (insaturado que diría Frege) de la indeterminada como índices. En el cuadro así compuesto, Newton muestra dificultades para encontrar
a muchas cuestiones su ultima referencia numérica. Las propuestas para asimilar a términos geométricos el comportamiento cinemático de las
curvas encuentran en la tangente su nudo gordiano. El calculo de su medida se perfila como un asunto problemático. Como en autores anteriores,
se intenta traspasar el efecto de la continuidad a la acción de medir a base de postular un continuo atomizado, desmembrado en partes significativas
y operativas, pero infinitesimales.
